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Abstract. We show that the model checking problem for intuitionistic propositional logic with
one variable is complete for logspace-uniform AC1. As basic tool we use the connection between
intuitionistic logic and Heyting algebra, and investigate its complexity theoretical aspects. For
superintuitionistic logics with one variable, we obtain NC1-completeness for the model checking
problem.
1. Introduction
Intuitionistic logic (see e.g. [10, 23]) is a part of classical logic that can be proven using
constructive proofs–e.g. by proofs that do not use reductio ad absurdum. For example, the law
of the excluded middle a ∨ ¬a and the weak law of the excluded middle ¬a ∨ ¬¬a do not have
constructive proofs and are not valid in intuitionistic logic. Not surprisingly, constructivism has
its costs. Whereas the validity problem is coNP-complete for classical propositional logic [6], for
intuitionistic propositional logic it is PSPACE-complete [19, 20]. The computational hardness
of intuitionistic logic is already reached with the fragment that has only formulas with two
variables: the validity problem for this fragment is already PSPACE-complete [18]. Recall that
every fragment of classical propositional logic with a fixed number of variables has an NC1-
complete validity problem (follows from [2]).
In this paper, we consider the complexity of intuitionistic propositional logic IPC with one
variable. The model checking problem—i.e. the problem to determine whether a given formula
is satisfied by a given intuitionistic Kripke model—for IPC is P-complete [13], even for the
fragment with two variables only [14]. More surprisingly, for the fragment with one variable
IPC1 we show the model checking problem to be AC
1-complete. To our knowledge, this is
the first “natural” AC1-complete problem, whereas formerly known AC1-complete problems (see
e.g. [1]) have some explicit logarithmic bound in the problem definition. A basic ingredient for
the AC1-completeness lies in normal forms for models and formulas as found by Nishimura [16],
that we reinvestigate under an algorithmic and complexity theoretical point of view. In contrast,
the formula value problem for classical propositional logic is NC1-complete [2] independent of
the number of variables.
Classical propositional logic is the extension of IPC with the axiom a ∨ ¬a. Those proper
extensions of intuitionistic logic are called superintuitionistic logics. The superintuitionistic logic
KC (see [9]) results from adding ¬a ∨ ¬¬a to IPC. We show that the model checking problem
for every superintuitionistic logic with one variable is NC1-complete (and easier than that for
IPC1). In contrast, for the superintuitionistic logic KC with two variables it is known to be
P-complete (and as hard as for IPC with two variables) [14].
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As a byproduct, we also obtain results for the validity problem for intuitionistic and superin-
tuitionistic logics with one variable.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notations we use for intuition-
istic logic and model checking. Section 3 is devoted to introduce the old results by Nishimura [16]
and to upgrade them with a complexity analysis. The following Section 4 presents our lower
and upper bound for model checking for IPC1. Section 5 deals with the complexity of the model
checking problem and the validity problem for superintuitionistic logics with one variable. The
implied completeness for the model checking for intuitionistic logic and conclusions are drawn
in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
Complexity (see e.g. [24]). The notion of reducibility we use is the logspace many-one re-
ducibility ≤logm , except for NC1-hardness, where we use first-order reducibility. NC1 and AC1
are the classes of sets that are decided by families of logspace-uniform circuits of polynomial
size and logarithmic depth. The circuits consist of and-, or-, and not-gates. The not-gates
have fan-in 1. For NC1, the and- and or-gates have fan-in 2 (bounded fan-in), whereas for
AC1 there is no bound on the fan-in of the gates (unbounded fan-in). ALOGTIME denotes the
class of sets decided by alternating Turing machines in logarithmic time, and we will use that
NC1 = ALOGTIME (see [17]). L denotes the class of sets decidable in logarithmic space. We
use ALOGSPACE[f(n)] to denote the class of sets decided by an alternating logspace Turing
machine that makes O(f(n)) alternations, where n is the length of the input. We will use that
AC1 = ALOGSPACE[log n] (see [7]). LOGdetCFL is the class of sets that are ≤logm -reducible to
deterministic context-free languages. It is also characterized as the class of sets decidable by
deterministic Turing machines in polynomial-time and logarithmic space with additional use of
a stack [5]. The inclusion structure of the classes we use is as follows.
NC1 ⊆ L ⊆ LOGdetCFL ⊆ AC1 ⊆ P ⊆ PSPACE
Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (see e.g. [23]). Let VAR denote a countable set of vari-
ables. The language IL of intuitionistic propositional logic is the same as that of propositional
logic PC, i.e. it is the set of all formulas of the form
φ ::= p | ⊥ | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→ φ),
where p ∈ VAR. For i ≥ 0 the languages ILi are the subsets/fragments of IL for which VAR
consists of i variables. In this paper we mainly consider IL1 (i.e. formulas with one variable).
As usual, we use the abbreviations ¬φ := φ→ ⊥ and > := ¬⊥. Because of the semantics of
intuitionistic logic, one cannot express ∧ or ∨ using → and ⊥.
An intuitionistic Kripke model for intuitionistic logic is a triple M = (U,R, ξ), where U is a
nonempty and finite set of states, R is a preorder on U (i.e. a reflexive and transitive binary
relation), and ξ : VAR→ P(U) is a function1 — the valuation function. Informally speaking, for
any variable it assigns the set of states in which this variable is satisfied. The valuation function
ξ is monotone in the sense that for every p ∈ VAR, a, b ∈ U : if a ∈ ξ(p) and aRb, then b ∈ ξ(p).
(U,R) can also be seen as a directed graph.
1P(U) denotes the powerset of U .
Martin Mundhenk and Felix Weiß 3
Given an intuitionistic Kripke modelM = (U,6, ξ) and a state s ∈ U , the satisfaction relation
for intuitionistic logics |= is defined as follows.
M, s 6|= ⊥
M, s |= p iff s ∈ ξ(p), p ∈ VAR,
M, s |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, s |= φ and M, s |= ψ,
M, s |= φ ∨ ψ iff M, s |= φ or M, s |= ψ,
M, s |= φ→ ψ iff ∀n > s : if M, n |= φ then M, n |= ψ
A formula φ is satisfied by an intuitionistic Kripke modelM in state s ifM, s |= φ. A tautology
is a formula that is satisfied by every intuitionistic Kripke model. Such formulas are also called
valid. From the monotonicity of ξ and the definition of |= follows the monotonicity for every
formula, i.e. for φ ∈ IL, w, v ∈W and w 6 v if M, w |= φ, then M, v |= φ.
The Model Checking Problem. This paper examines the complexity of model checking
problems for intuitionistic logics.
Problem: IPC1-Mc
Input: 〈φ,M, s〉, where φ ∈ IL1, M is an intuitionistic Kripke model, and s is a
state of M
Question: M, s |= φ ?
We assume that formulas and intuitionistic Kripke models are encoded in a straightforward
way. This means, a formula is given as a text, and the graph (U,R) of an intuitionistic Kripke
model is given by its adjacency matrix that takes |U |2 bits.
3. Properties of IPC1 and its complexity
Formulas with one variable. The set IL1 of formulas with at most one variable is partitioned
into infinitely many equivalence2 classes [16]. This was shown using the formulas that are
inductively defined as follows (see e.g.[10]).
We use a for the only variable.
ϕ1 := ¬a ψ1 := a
ϕn+1 := ϕn → ψn ψn+1 := ϕn ∨ψn for n ≥ 1
The formulas ⊥,>,ϕ1,ψ1,ϕ2,ψ2, . . . are called Rieger-Nishimura formulas.
Theorem 3.1. ([16], cf.[10, Chap.6,Thm.7]) Every formula in IL1 is equivalent to exactly one
of the Rieger-Nishimura formulas.
The function RNindex maps every formula to the index of its equivalent Rieger-Nishimura
formula. We call this index Rieger-Nishimura index.
2α is equivalent to β if every state in every intuitionistic Kripke model satisfies both or none formula. We
write α ≡ β.
4 The model checking problem for intuitionistic logic with one variable is AC1-complete
RNindex (α) =

(i, phi), if α ≡ ϕi
(i, psi), if α ≡ ψi
(0,⊥), if α ≡ ⊥
(0,>), if α ≡ >
In the following we analyse the complexity of RNindex . For φ ∈ IL1 let [φ] denote the
equivalence class that contains φ. The equivalence classes of IL1 form a free Heyting algebra
over one generator (for algebraic details see [11]). This algebra is also called the Rieger-Nishimura
lattice (see Fig. 1). It is shown in [16] that the lattice operations can be calculated using a big
table look-up (see Appendix A). For α, β ∈ IL1, the binary lattice operators u, unionsq and _ are
defined as follows. [α] u [β] = [α ∧ β], [α] unionsq [β] = [α ∨ β], and [α] _ [β] = [δ], where [δ] is the
largest element w.r.t. v3 with inf{[α], [δ]} v [β].4 We use the algebraic properties of IPC1 to
give a lower bound on the length of formulas5 in the equivalence classes of IL1 (Lemma 3.2), and
to give an upper bound on the complexity of the problem to decide the Rieger-Nishimura index
of a formula (Lemma 3.3). Let rank(α) be the first element—the integer—of the RNindex (α)
pair.
...
...
...
...
...
[⊥]
[ψ1][ϕ1]
[ϕ2][ψ2]
[ψ3][ϕ3]
[ϕ4][ψ4]
[ψ5][ϕ5]
[>]
Figure 1. The Rieger-Nishimura lattice.
Lemma 3.2. For every φ ∈ IL1 it holds that rank(φ) ≤ c · log(|φ|), for a constant c independent
of φ.
3The induced partial order is denoted by v (a v b⇔ a u b = a).
4_ is called the relative pseudo-complement operation.
5|α| denotes the length of the formula α, and it is the number of appearances of variables, connectives, and
constants in α.
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Proof. The proof relies on the following technical claim. Let fib(n) denote the n-th Fibonacci
number6.
Claim 1. Let α ∈ IL1. Then |α| ≥ fib(rank(α)).
Proof of Claim. For formulas α ∈ [⊥] ∪ [>] it holds that rank(α) = 0. For formulas not in
[⊥] ∪ [>], we prove the claim by induction on the length of α. The only relevant formula of
length 1 is α = a. Since rank(a) = 1 and fib(1) = 1, the statement holds.
For the induction step let α ∈ IL1 \ ([⊥]∪ [>]) with |α| > 1 and α = β ?γ with ? ∈ {→,∧,∨}.
Then |α| = |β| + |γ| + 1, and using the induction hypothesis we obtain |α| ≥ fib(rank(β)) +
fib(rank(γ)) + 1. We have to distinguish the following cases. (For the lattice operations see
Appendix A.)
(i) γ ∈ [⊥].
Due to the fact that α /∈ [⊥]∪[>] it follows that ? ∈ {→,∨}. If ? = ∨, clearly β ∈ [α] and
rank(β) = rank(α). With the induction hypothesis it follows that |α| ≥ fib(rank(β)) =
fib(rank(α)). Otherwise if ? = →, it follows that β ∈ [ϕ1]∪[ϕ2]∪[ψ1] and α ∈ [ϕ2]∪[ϕ1].
Hence |α| ≥ |β|+ 2 > 2 > fib(2) ≥ fib(rank(α)).
(ii) β ∈ [⊥].
This leads to ? = ∨ and can be treated analogously to the case γ ∈ [⊥].
(iii) β ∈ [>] (resp. γ ∈ [>]).
Remember that α /∈ [>], hence independent of the choice of ? it holds that [α] = [γ]
(resp. [α] = [β] and it follows that |α| > fib(rank(α)).
(iv) The remaining cases.
With the induction hypothesis it follows that |α| ≥ fib(rank(β)) + fib(rank(γ)). With
respect to the Rieger-Nishimura lattice, we have to handle two cases.
(a) rank(α) ≤ rank(β) or rank(α) ≤ rank(γ).
In this case it is not hard to see that |α| ≥ fib(rank(β))+fib(rank(γ)) ≥ fib(rank(α)).
(b) rank(α) > rank(β) and rank(α) > rank(γ).
In this case it holds that one of the ranks of β and γ needs to be ≥ rank(α) − 2
and the other ≥ rank(α) − 1. (See Appendix A, for example ϕk−1 → ψk−2 ≡ ϕk
respectively [ϕk−1] _ [ψk−2] = [ϕk] for k ≥ 2.) Therefore it holds that |α| ≥
fib(rank(α)− 2) + fib(rank(α)− 1) = fib(rank(α)).
Claim 1 shows |φ| ≥ fib(rank(φ)). Because of the exponential growth of the Fibonacci numbers
(fib(n) ≥ Φn where Φ denotes the golden ratio) it follows that |φ| ≥ c · log(|φ|) where c is
independent of φ. 2
In order to analyse the complexity of the Rieger-Nishimura index computation, we define the
following decision problem.
Problem: EqRNformula
Input: 〈α, (i, x)〉, where α ∈ IL1 and (i, x) is a Rieger-Nishimura index
Question: RNindex (α) = (i, x)?
Lemma 3.3. EqRNformula is in LOGdetCFL.
6Let fib(0) = 1, fib(1) = 1, and fib(n+ 2) = fib(n+ 1) + fib(n) for n ≥ 0.
6 The model checking problem for intuitionistic logic with one variable is AC1-complete
Proof. We form Algorithm 1 based on the Rieger-Nishimura lattice of the equivalence classes of
IL1. The lattice and the lattice operations u, unionsq and _ are described in Appendix A. We can
analogously define the lattice operations u, unionsq and _ for the Rieger-Nishimura indices instead
of the equivalence classes7.
The correctness of Algorithm 1 is straightforward because the lattice operations for equiva-
lence classes and indices are the same. With Lemma 3.2 it follows that every variable value used
in Algorithm 1 can be stored in logarithmic space. The algorithm walks recursively through the
formula and computes the index of every subformula once, hence running time is polynomial. All
information that are necessary for recursion can be stored on the stack. Therefore Algorithm 1
can be implemented on a polynomial time logspace machine that uses an additional stack, i.e.
a LOGdetCFL-machine. 2
Algorithm 1 Rieger-Nishimura index check.
Require: a formula φ ∈ ILi and a Rieger-Nishimura index (i, x)
1: if RNIndex-calc(φ) = (i, x) then accept else reject
2: function RNIndex-calc(ψ) // returns a Rieger-Nishimura index
3: if ψ = a then return (1, psi)
4: else if ψ = > then return (0,>)
5: else if ψ = ⊥ then return (0,⊥)
6: else if ψ = β ∧ γ then return RNIndex-calc(β) u RNIndex-calc(γ)
7: else if ψ = β ∨ γ then return RNIndex-calc(β) unionsq RNIndex-calc(γ)
8: else if ψ = β → γ then return RNIndex-calc(β) _ RNIndex-calc(γ)
9: end if
Canonical models. Similar as any formula can be represented by its index, intuitionistic
Kripke models can be represented, too. We give a construction of models—the canonical mod-
els—that are also used to distinguish the formula equivalence classes (Theorem 3.4). Our defi-
nition differs a little bit from that in [10, Chap.6, Defi.5]. From Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 it follows
that every state s in every intuitionistic Kripke model M over one variable has a unique corre-
sponding canonical model Hn in the sense that the state s and the base state8 n of Hn satisfy
exactly the same formulas. This was already shown in [10, Chap.6, Lemma 11]. Further define a
function h that maps (M, s) to n. For n ≥ 1, we define the canonical models Hn = (Wn,E, ξn)
as follows.
Wn := {1, 2, . . . , n− 2} ∪ {n}
E := {(a, b) | a, b ∈Wn, a = b or a ≥ b+ 2}
ξn(a) :=
{
∅, if n = 2
{1}, otherwise.
See Figure 2 for some examples.
7Let α, β, γ ∈ IL1 and ? ∈ {u,unionsq,_}. We set RNindex (α) ? RNindex (β) = k if [α] ? [β] = [γ] and k =
RNindex (γ).
8A state is a base state in a model if it has no predecessors (beside itself) w.r.t to the preorder of the model.
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1 2
3 4
5 6
7
9
H9
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
10
H10
Figure 2. The canonical models H9 and H10 (reflexive and transitive edges are
not depicted, ξn(a) = {1} is indicated by the double circle for state 1).
The formulas in IL1 can be distinguished using the canonical models as follows.
Theorem 3.4. ([16],cf.[10, Chap.6, Thm.8]) For every n ≥ 1 and every k ≥ 1 it holds that:
(1) Hn, n |= ψk iff n ≤ k (i.e. k ∈ {n, n+ 1, . . .}), and
(2) Hn, n |= ϕk iff n < k or n = k + 1 (i.e. k ∈ {n− 1} ∪ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . .}).
For analysing the complexity of the decision problem whether a canonical model is the corre-
sponding model of a state of an arbitrary given intuitionistic Kripke model we define a function
h . The function h maps a given intuitionistic Kripke modelM and state w ofM to the index i
of the corresponding model Hi. Let M = (W,6, ζ) be an intuitionistic Kripke model and w a
state of M. We define two abbreviations for w ∈W .
Ww⇑ := {v ∈W | w 6 v}
Ww↑ := Ww⇑ \ {w}
The function h is defined as follows.
h(M, w) :=

1, if w ∈ ζ(a)
2, if w 6∈ ζ(a) and ∀v ∈Ww↑ : v 6∈ ζ(a)
3, if w 6∈ ζ(a) and ∀v ∈Ww↑ : h(M, v) 6= 2 and
∃u ∈Ww↑ : h(M, u) = 1
n+ 2, if ∀v ∈Ww↑ : h(M, v) 6= n+ 1 and
∃u1, u2 ∈Ww↑ : h(M, u1) = n and h(M, u2) = n− 1
We call h(M, w) the model index of w in M. The function h is well defined because for every
state w it holds that {h(M, v) | v ∈Ww⇑} = {1, 2, . . . , h(M, w)− 2} ∪ {h(M, w)}.
Theorem 3.5. Let M be an intuitionistic Kripke model, w a state of M, and k ≥ 1. Then it
holds that
8 The model checking problem for intuitionistic logic with one variable is AC1-complete
M, w |= ψk iff k ≥ h(M, w), and
M, w |= ϕk iff k > h(M, w) or k = h(M, w)− 1.
Proof. From Theorem 3.4 follows that (1) is equivalent to the following claim.
Claim 2. Let M be an intuitionistic Kripke model and w a state of M. For every Rieger-
Nishimura formula α it holds that M, w |= α if and only if Hh(M,w), h(M, w) |= α.
Proof of Claim. We prove this by induction on the rank rank(α) of α. Let M = (W,6, ζ)
be an intuitionistic Kripke model, w ∈W a state, and α a Rieger-Nishimura formula. The case
rank(α) ∈ {0, 1} is clear. For the induction step we consider a formula α with rank(α) > 1. We
distinguish two cases. The case α = ψk is clear because ψk = ϕk−1∨ψk−1 and the claim follows
directly from the induction hypothesis. In the second case we have α = ϕk.
M, w |= ϕk (= ϕk−1 → ψk−1) (1)
⇔ ∀v ∈W,w 6 v : if M, v |= ϕk−1 then M, v |= ψk−1 (2)
⇔ ∀v ∈W,w 6 v : if Hh(M,v), h(M, v) |= ϕk−1
then Hh(M,v), h(M, v) |= ψk−1 (3)
⇔ ∀x ∈Wh(M,w) : if Hx, x |= ϕk−1 then Hx, x |= ψk−1 (4)
⇔ ∀x ∈Wh(M,w) : if Hh(M,w), x |= ϕk−1 then Hh(M,w), x |= ψk−1 (5)
⇔ Hh(M,w), h(M, w) |= ϕk−1 → ψk−1 (= ϕk) (6)
The equivalence between (1) and (2) is clear due to the definition of →. From the induction
hypothesis follows the equivalence between (2) and (3). (3) and (4) are equivalent because
{h(M, v) | v ∈ W,w 6 v} = {1, 2, . . . , h(M, w)− 2} ∪ {h(M, w)} = Wh(M,w). The definition of
the canonical models, i.e. Hx is a submodel of Hh(M,w), causes the equivalence between (4) and
(5). The last equivalence between (5) and (6) comes from the definition of→ and the properties
of Hh(M,w). 2
4. The complexity of model checking for IPC1
We first define an AC1-hard graph problem, that is similar to the P-complete alternating
graph accessibility problem [4], but has some additional simplicity properties. Then we give a
construction that transforms such a graph into an intuitionistic Kripke model. This transforma-
tion is the basis for the reduction from the alternating graph accessibility problem to the model
checking problem for IPC1.
4.1. Alternating graph problems. The alternating graph accessibility problem is shown to
be P-complete in [4]. We use the following restricted version of this problem that is very similar
to Boolean circuits with and- and or-gates (and input-gates). An alternating slice graph [13]
G = (V,E) is a directed bipartite acyclic graph with a bipartitioning V = V∃∪V∀, and a further
partitioning V = V0∪V1∪V2∪· · ·∪Vm−1 (m slices, Vi∩Vj = ∅ if i 6= j) where V∃ =
⋃
i<m,i odd Vi
and V∀ =
⋃
i<m,i even Vi, such that E ⊆
⋃
i=1,2,...,m−1 Vi×Vi−1 — i.e. all edges go from slice Vi to
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slice Vi−1 (for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1). All nodes excepted those in the last slice V0 have a positive
outdegree. Nodes in V∃ are called existential nodes, and nodes in V∀ are called universal nodes.
Alternating paths from node x to node y are defined as follows by the property apathG(x, y).
1): apathG(x, x) holds for all x ∈ V
2a): for x ∈ V∃: apathG(x, y) iff ∃z ∈ V∀ : (x, z) ∈ E and apathG(z, y)
2b): for x ∈ V∀: apathG(x, y) iff ∀z ∈ V∃ : if (x, z) ∈ E then apathG(z, y)
The problem AsAgap is similar to the alternating graph accessibility problem, but for the
restricted class of alternating slice graphs.
Problem: AsAgap
Input: 〈G, s, t〉, where G = (V∃ ∪ V∀, E) is an alternating slice graph with slices
V0, V1, . . . , Vm−1, and s ∈ Vm−1 ∩ V∃, t ∈ V0 ∩ V∀
Question: does apathG(s, t) hold?
Similarly as the alternating graph accessibility problem, AsAgap is P-complete [13, Lemma
2]. The following technical Lemma is not hard to prove.
Lemma 4.1. For every set A in (logspace-uniform) AC1 exists a function f that maps instances
x of A to instances f(x) = 〈Gx, sx, tx〉 of AsAgap and satisfies the following properties.
(1) f is computable in logspace.
(2) Gx is an alternating slice graph of logarithmic depth; i.e. if Gx has n nodes, then it has
m ≤ log n slices.
(3) For all instances x of A holds: x ∈ A if and only if f(x) ∈ AsAgap.
Essentially, the function f constructs the AC1 circuit C|x| with input x, and transforms it to
an alternating slice graph Gx. The goal node tx represents exactly the bits of x that are 1. The
start node sx corresponds to the output gate of C|x|, and apathGx(sx, tx) expresses that C|x|
accepts input x.
If we consider AsAgaplog as the subset of AsAgap where the slice graphs have logarithmic
depth, this lemma would express that AsAgaplog is AC
1-hard under logspace reductions.
4.2. Alternating slice graphs and intuitionistic Kripke models. Our hardness results
rely on a transformation of instances 〈G, s, t〉 of AsAgap to intuitionistic Kripke modelsMG :=
(U,R, ξ). Let 〈G, s, t〉 be an instance of AsAgap for the slice graph G = (V∃ ∪ V∀, EG) with the
m slices V∃ = Vm−1 ∪ Vm−3 ∪ · · · ∪ V1 and V∀ = Vm−2 ∪ Vm−4 ∪ · · · ∪ V0.
For every i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1, we construct two sets of new states
W ini := {vin | v ∈ Vi}, and
W outi := {vout | v ∈ Vi}
and let
W :=
m−1⋃
i=0
(W ini ∪W outi ).
Every edge (u, v) from EG is transformed to an edge (u
out , vin) from an out-node to an in-node,
and every in-node has an edge to its corresponding out-copy. This yields the set of edges
10 The model checking problem for intuitionistic logic with one variable is AC1-complete
E :=
{
(uout , vin) | (u, v) ∈ EG
} ∪ {(vin , vout) | v ∈ V∃ ∪ V∀} .
Let G′ = (W,E) be the graph obtained in this way from G. If we consider those nodes vx ∈W
as ∃-nodes (resp. ∀-nodes) that come from nodes v ∈ V∃ (resp. v ∈ V∀), then apathG(u, v) if
and only if apathG′(u
out, vin).
Next, we add the nodes of the canonical model H4m = ({1, 2, . . . , 4m − 2} ∪ {4m},
E, ξ4m) to G′ as follows. Add the nodes 1 and 2 to W out0 , the nodes 3 and 4 to W in0 , the
nodes 5 and 6 to W out1 etc. Formally, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 2, let
Souti := W
out
i ∪ {4i+ 1, 4i+ 2},
Sini := W
in
i ∪ {4i+ 3, 4i+ 4}, and
Sinm−1 := W inm−1 ∪ {4m}.
The set of states for our model is now
U :=
m−1⋃
i=0
(Souti ∪ Sini ) .
Note that (U,E) is still a slice graph with slices Sinm−1, Soutm−1, Sinm−2, . . . . We yet have no edges
that connect to nodes from the canonical model. First we add only those edges between these
nodes that do not disturb the “slice graph” property, namely
H := {(i, i− 2) | i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 4m− 2} ∪ {4m}} ∪
{(i, i− 3) | i ∈ {4, 6, . . . , 4m− 2, 4m}}.
Note that H consists of the edges from H4m that give the canonical model its typical structure,
i.e. E is the transitive closure of H. Second we add edges from every node in W xi to a node in
the neighboured slice Sxi−1 from H4m depending on whether x = in or x = out9.
Tin := {(u, 4i+ 2) | u ∈W ini , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1}
Tout := {(u, 4i− 1) | u ∈W outi , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1}
Notice that (U,E ∪ H ∪ Tin ∪ Tout) is still a slice graph with the slices mentioned above. It
is depicted in Figure 3). An intuitionistic Kripke model must be transitive and reflexive. The
reduction function that transforms alternating slice graphs to intuitionistic Kripke models must
be computable in logarithmic space. Within this space bound we cannot compute the transitive
closure of a graph. Therefore, we make the graph transitive with brute force. We add all edges
that jump over at least one slice—we call these edges pseudotransitive.
P :=
1⋃
i=m−1
[(
Sini ×
0⋃
j=i−1
Sinj ∪ Soutj
)
∪(
Souti ×
(
Souti−1 ∪
0⋃
j=i−2
Sinj ∪ Soutj
))]
Finally, we need to add all reflexive edges.
9x = in if x = out and vice versa.
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21
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Figure 3. An alternating slice graph G (left) and the resulting intuitionistic
Kripke modelMG (right); both the states in ξ(a) are drawn doubly; pseudotran-
sitive and reflexive edges in MG are not depicted. The value at state x denotes
its model index h(MG, x). For states in H16, their names and their model indices
coincide. States vin and vout for which apathG(v, t) holds in G are coloured grey.
T := {(u, u) | u ∈ U}
Notice that the subgraph induced by the states of the canonical model H4m that consists of the
edges in H plus the pseudotransitive and the reflexive edges, is exactly H4m.
Eventually, the relation R for our model is
R := E ∪H ∪ Tin ∪ Tout ∪ P ∪ T,
and the valuation function for our model is
ξ(a) := {tout , 1},
where tout is the copy of the goal node t in W out0 , and {1} = ξ4m(a) is the node from H4m. This
yields the intuitionistic Kripke model MG = (U,R, ξ). An example of an AsAgap instance
〈G, s, t〉 and the corresponding intuitionistic Kripke modelMG constructed from it can be seen
in Figure 3.
The states from the canonical model were added to the slice graph in order to obtain control
over the model indices of the other states (w.r.t. the model MG). Our controlling tool is the
function h which is defined in the previous section. It maps every state of an intuitionistic
Kripke model to its model index. This is described by Proposition 4.2 and Proposition 4.3.
Proposition 4.2. For every i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1 and every v ∈ Vi holds
h(MG, vout) ∈ {4i+ 1, 4i+ 2} and h(MG, vin) ∈ {4i+ 2, 4i+ 4} .
Proof. We prove this by induction on the slices. For the base case we consider v ∈W out0 , where
we have h(MG, v) = 1 if v = tout , and h(MG, v) = 2 if v 6= tout , and therefore h(MG, v) ∈ {1, 2}.
For the induction step, we consider the remaining slices.
For vin ∈ W ini , we have (vin , 4i + 2) ∈ R and (vout , w) ∈ R for some w ∈ W outi . By the
induction hypothesis it follows that h(MG, u) ≤ 4i+ 2 for all u ∈ Uvin↑. By the definition of h
it follows that h(MG, vin) ∈ {4i+ 2, 4i+ 4}.
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For vout ∈ W outi , we have (vout , 4i − 1) ∈ R. By the induction hypothesis we know that for
all (vout , w) ∈ R with w ∈ W ini−1 holds h(MG, w) ∈ {4i − 2, 4i}, and h(MG, u) ≤ 4i for all
u ∈ Uvout↑. Now, if for some w ∈ W ini−1 ∩ Uvout↑ holds h(MG, w) = 4i, then vout has successors
with model indices 4i and 4i− 1 and by the definition of h it follows that h(MG, vout) = 4i+ 2.
Otherwise, for all w ∈ W ini−1 ∩ Uvout↑ holds h(MG, w) = 4i − 2, and vout has no successor with
model index 4i but successors with model indices 4i−2 and 4i−1. By the definition of h it now
follows that h(MG, vout) = 4i+ 1. 2
Proposition 4.3. For every i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1 and every v ∈ Vi holds:
(1) if i is even (∀ slice):
apathG(v, t) if and only if h(MG, vout) = 4i+ 1, and
apathG(v, t) if and only if h(MG, vin) = 4i+ 4,
(2) if i is odd (∃ slice):
apathG(v, t) if and only if h(MG, vout) = 4i+ 2, and
apathG(v, t) if and only if h(MG, vin) = 4i+ 2.
Proof. We prove this proposition by induction on i. The initial step for vout ∈ W out0 follows
directly from the definition of MG.
Now for the induction step. Consider v ∈ Vi for even i (∀ slice).
apathG(v, t) (1)
⇔ ∀w ∈ Vi−1, (v, w) ∈ EG : apathG(w, t) (2)
⇔ ∀win ∈W ini−1, (vout , win) ∈ R : h(MG, win) = 4i− 2 (3)
⇔ {h(MG, u) | u ∈ Uvout↑} = {1, 2, . . . , 4i− 1} (4)
⇔ h(MG, vout) = 4i+ 1 (5)
(1) and (2) are equivalent by the definition of apathG. The equivalence of (2) and (3) comes
from the construction ofMG and the induction hypothesis. To show the equivalence of (3) and
(4) we prove both the directions separately. First we show (3) ⇒ (4). Because of (3) there
is no win ∈ W ini−1 with h(MG, win) > 4i − 1. If {4i − 1, 4i − 2} ⊆ {h(MG, u) | u ∈ Uvout↑},
then (4) follows directly. For 4i − 2 it follows directly from (3). If 4i − 1 6∈ {h(MG, u) | u ∈
Uvout↑}, then h(MG, vout) ∈ {4i} ∪ {4i − 2, 4i − 3, . . . , 1}. Because of (3), it is not possible
that h(MG, vout) < 4i. And h(MG, vout) = 4i is inconsistent with Proposition 4.2. Hence
{h(MG, u) | u ∈ Uvout↑} = {1, 2, . . . , 4i − 1}. For the second direction, (4) ⇒ (3), assume that
there is some win ∈ W ini−1 with h(MG, win) 6= 4i − 2. Then from Proposition 4.2 it follows
that h(MG, win) = 4i but this is inconsistent with (4). Hence (3) and (4) are equivalent. (4)
equivalent (5) by the construction of MG and the definition of h .
By Proposition 4.2 we know that h(MG, vout) ∈ {4i + 1, 4i + 2}. Remind that vin has vout
and 4i+ 2 as its direct successors and h(MG, vout) = 4i+ 1. Therefore, apathG(v, t) if and only
if {4i + 1, 4i + 2} ⊆ {h(MG, u) | u ∈ Uvin↑} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 4i + 2}, where the latter is equivalent
h(MG, vin) = 4i+ 4.
Finally, we consider v ∈ Vi for odd i (∃ slice).
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apathG(v, t) (1)
⇔ ∃w ∈ Vi−1, (v, w) ∈ EG : apathG(w, t) (2)
⇔ ∃win ∈W ini−1, (vout , win) ∈ R : h(MG, win) = 4i (3)
⇔ {4i− 1, 4i} ⊆ {h(MG, u) | u ∈ Uvout↑} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 4i} (4)
⇔ h(MG, vout) = 4i+ 2 (5)
(1) and (2) are equivalent by the definition of apathG. The equivalence of (2) and (3) comes
from the construction of MG and the induction hypothesis. As in the case above (i is even)
the equivalence of (3) and (4) follows from the construction of MG and Proposition 4.2. (4)
equivalent (5) by the construction of MG and the definition of h .
By Proposition 4.2 we know that h(MG, vout) ∈ {4i + 1, 4i + 2}. Remind that vin has vout
and 4i+ 2 as its direct successors. Therefore, apathG(v, t) if and only if {4i+ 2} ⊆ {h(MG, u) |
u ∈ Uvin↑} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 4i} ∪ {4i+ 2}, where the latter is equivalent h(MG, vin) = 4i+ 2. 2
Let g denote the function that maps instances x = 〈G, s, t〉 of AsAgap to intuitionistic Kripke
models g(x) =MG as described above. The following properties of g are easy to verify.
Lemma 4.4.
(1) g is logspace computable.
(2) If x = 〈G, s, t〉 for an alternating slice graph G with n nodes and m < n slices, then g(x)
is an intuitionistic Kripke model with ≤ 4n states and depth 2m.
We will use g as part of the reduction functions for our hardness results.
4.3. Lower and upper bounds. Our first result states that the calculation of the model index
of an intuitionistic Kripke model is P-complete. It is already P-complete to decide the last bit
of this model index.
Theorem 4.5. The following problems are P-complete.
(1) Given an intuitionistic Kripke model M and a state w, decide whether h(M, w) is even.
(2) Given an intuitionistic Kripke model M, a state w, and an integer i, decide whether
h(M, w) = i.
Proof. In order to show the P-hardness of the problems, we give a reduction from the P-hard
problem AsAgap. From an instance 〈G, s, t〉 of AsAgap where G is an alternating slice graph
with m slices, constructM = g(〈G, s, t〉). Then h(M, sout) ∈ {4m+1, 4m+2} (Proposition 4.2),
and apathG(s, t) if and only if h(M, sout) = 4m + 2 (Proposition 4.3). Therefore, 〈G, s, t〉 ∈
AsAgap if and only if h(M, sout) is even respectively h(M, sout) = 4m+ 2.
For every intuitionistic Kripke modelM = (U,6, ξ) it holds that h(M, w) ≤ |U |+1. To decide
for a given intuitionistic Kripke modelM, a state w ofM, and an integer n the problem “Does
h(M, w) = n hold?” is in ALOGSPACE[n]. The function h can be implemented according to its
definition straightforwardly as a logarithmically space bounded alternating algorithm. It requires
an alternation depth of at most n due to the construction of h . Using that P = ALOGSPACE[poly ]
[4] then it follows that both problems are in P. 2
In the construction of the above proof, the decision whether h(M, sout) = 4m+ 2 is the same
as to decide whetherM, sout |= ψ4m+2, for the Rieger-Nishimura formula ψ4m+2 (Theorems 3.4
14 The model checking problem for intuitionistic logic with one variable is AC1-complete
and 3.5). Unfortunately, the length of ψ4m+2 is exponential in m (Lemma 3.2), and therefore the
mapping from 〈G, s, t〉 (with m slices) to the model checking instance 〈ψ4m+2, g(〈G, s, t〉), sout〉
cannot in general be performed in logarithmic space. But if the depth m of the slice graph is
logarithmic, the respective formula ψ4m+2 has polynomial size only and the reduction works in
logarithmic space.
Theorem 4.6. The model checking problem for IPC1 is AC
1-hard.
Proof. Let B be in AC1. By Lemma 4.1 there exists a logspace computable function fB such
that for all instances x of B, x ∈ B if and only if fB(x) ∈ AsAgap, where fB(x) = 〈Gx, sx, tx〉
for an alternating slice graph Gx with nx nodes and mx ≤ log nx slices. The following function
r reduces B to the model checking problem for IPC1.
r(x) = 〈ψ4mx+2, g(fB(x)), soutx 〉
r can be computed in logspace. Since fB is logspace computable, it follows that g(fB(x)) and
soutx can be computed in logspace. The Rieger-Nishimura formula ψ4mx+2 can also be computed
in logspace, because mx is logarithmic in |x| and therefore ψ4mx+2 has length polynomial in |x|.
B logspace reduces to the model checking problem for IPC1 via the reduction function r. By
Propostion 4.3 we have that 〈Gx, sx, tx〉 ∈ AsAgap if and only if
h(g(〈Gx, sx, tx〉), soutx ) = 4mx + 2. By the properties of the Rieger-Nishimura formulas (Theo-
rem 3.4) this is equivalent to g(〈Gx, sx, tx〉), soutx |= ψ4mx+2. This shows the correctness of the
reduction. 2
In the following theorem we show an upper bound for the IPC1 model checking problem.
Theorem 4.7. The model checking problem for IPC1 is in AC
1.
Proof. First we show that Algorithm 2 decides the model checking problem and then we analyse
its complexity.
We show that Algorithm 2 accepts the input 〈ϕ,M, s〉 if and only if M, s |= ϕ. Informally
speaking Algorithm 2 accepts the input if and only if RNindex (ϕ) and the model index h(M, s)
of s in M match according to Theorem 3.5.
Instead of computing the equivalent Rieger-Nishimura formula, Algorithm 2 only calculates
its Rieger-Nishimura index. This is done in Lines 1 and 2. The trivial cases are handled in
Lines 3 and 4. From Theorem 3.5 we know for an arbitrary Rieger-Nishimura formula αk with
rank(αk) = k > 0 the following. Either αk = ψk and it holds that h(M, s) ≤ k if and only
if M, s |= αk. This is checked in Line 6. Or αk = ϕk and it holds that h(M, s) = k + 1 or
h(M, s) < k if and only ifM, s |= αk. This is checked in Line 9. If h(M, s) > rank(ϕ) + 1, then
it holds that M, s 6|= ϕ (Theorems 3.4 and 3.5).
In the following, we estimate the complexity of Algorithm 2. It gets 〈ϕ,M, s〉 as input. In
Line 1 Algorithm 2 guesses a Rieger-Nishimura index (r, x). The decision in Line 2 whether
〈ϕ, (r, x)〉 ∈ EqRNformula can be done with the resources of LOGdetCFL (Lemma 3.3). To
decide for a given intuitionistic Kripke modelM, a state w ofM, and an integer n the problem
“Does h(M, w) = n hold?” is in ALOGSPACE[n]. The function h can be implemented according
to its definition straightforwardly as a logarithmically space bounded alternating algorithm. It
requires an alternation depth of at most n due to the construction of h . Hence the decision
in Line 6 (resp. Line 9) whether h(M, s) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} (resp. h(M, s) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1} ∪
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Algorithm 2 model checking algorithm for IPC1
Require: a formula φ ∈ IL1, an intuitionistic Kripke model M and a state s
1: guess nondeterministically a Rieger-Nishimura index (r, x) with r ≤ c · log(|φ|)
2: if 〈φ, (r, x)〉 ∈ EqRNformula then
3: if (r, x) = (0,⊥) then reject
4: else if (r, x) = (0,>) then accept
5: else if x = psi then
6: if h(M, s) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} then accept
7: else reject
8: else if x = phi then
9: if h(M, s) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1} ∪ {r + 1} then accept
10: else reject
11: end if
12: else reject
{r + 1}) can be done with r (resp. r + 1) alternations. Since r is at most about c · log(|φ|)
(Lemma 3.2), these decisions can be done with at most c · log(|〈φ,M, s〉|) alternations. During
the complete computation, the algorithm only needs to store a constant number of Rieger-
Nishimura indices and model indices. According to Lemma 3.2 and the fact that h(M, w) ≤ |M|,
Algorithm 2 requires during the alternations logarithmic space. Since LOGdetCFL ⊆ AC1 =
ALOGSPACE[log n], we obtain the desired upper bound. 2
5. Some notes on superintuitionistic logics with one variable
Superintuitionistic propositional logics are logics that have more valid formulas than IPC.
In this sense, classical propositional logic is a superintuitionistic logic, since it can be obtained
as the closure under substitution and modus ponens of the tautologies from IPC plus a ∨ ¬a
as additional axiom. A well-studied superintuitionistic logic is KC [9] that results from adding
the weak law of the excluded middle ¬a ∨ ¬¬a to IPC. Semantically, the intuitionistic Kripke
models for KC are restricted to those intuitionistic Kripke models M = (W,6, ξ) where 6
is a directed preorder. Whereas IL1 over preorders has infinitely many equivalence classes
of formulas, IL1 over directed preorders has only 7 equivalence classes—represented by the
Rieger-Nishimura formulas ⊥,>,ϕ1,ψ1,ϕ2,ψ2,ϕ3—that can be distinguished using the first 3
canonical models [16, 12]. This follows from ¬a∨¬¬a ≡ ψ3. The function h can be implemented
for such models as an alternating Turing machine that runs in logarithmic time, if the function
value is fixed to a finite range—that in this case is {1, 2, 3}—independent of the input. For
KC1, the Rieger-Nishimura index of the formulas also has a finite range (as mentioned above).
Therefore, it can be calculated by an alternating Turing machine that runs in logarithmic time
similar to the machine presented by Buss [3] that calculates the value of a Boolean formula.
Instead of the Boolean values 0 and 1, here we have 7 different Rieger-Nishimura indices. The
rules how the index of a formula can be calculated from the indices of its subformulas and the
connective, follow directly from the Rieger-Nishimura lattice operations—see Appendix A. If the
indices are bound to a finite range, this big table yields an even bigger but finite table without
index-variables. For example, the equivalence ϕn ∨ϕn+1 ≡ ψn+2 for all n ≥ 1 induces the three
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equivalences ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ≡ ψ3, ϕ2 ∨ > ≡ >, and > ∨ > ≡ > for KC1. This yields alternating
logarithmic-time (= NC1) as upper bound for the validity problem for KC1.
There are infinitely many superintuitionistic logics (with one variable) that can be obtained by
adding any not valid formula as axiom to IPC1. For example, if we add a formula equivalent to
ψk, then the superintuitionistic logic obtained has finitely many equivalence classes represented
by ⊥,>,ϕ1,ψ1, . . . ,ϕk−1,ψk−1,ϕk. With similar arguments as for KC1 we can conclude that
the model checking problems of these logics all are in NC1. Moreover, the formula value problem
for Boolean formulas without variables is NC1-hard [2]. Intuitionistic formulas without variables
have the same values, if they are interpreted as classical Boolean formulas. This means, the
semantics of→ is the same for Boolean formulas and for intuitionistic formulas without variables.
Therefore, the model checking problem for any superintuitionistic logic without variables is NC1-
hard, too.
The validity problem for superintuitionistic logic has the same complexity, since in order to
decide whether a formula with one variable is valid it suffices to know its Rieger-Nishimura
index.
6. Conclusion
We consider computational problems that appear with intuitionistic propositional logic with-
out variables and with one variable. We characterize the complexity of model checking for
intuitionistic logic.
Theorem 6.1.
(1) The model checking problem for IPC0 is NC
1-complete.
(2) The model checking problem for IPC1 is AC
1-complete.
Part(1) follows from the fact that an intuitionistic formula that contains constants ⊥ and >
but no variables can be evaluated like a Boolean formula, whose evaluation problem is NC1-
complete [2] independently of the number of variables. Part (2) follows from Theorems 4.6 and
4.7. It shows a difference between IPC1 and its modal companion S4 with one variable, for
which the model checking problem is P-complete [13].
Intuitionistic logic with one variable turns out to be very interesting. There are infinitely
many equivalence classes of formulas, and according to Lemma 3.2 even the sequence of smallest
formulas of these equivalence classes has an exponential growth with respect to the length of the
formulas. Such a fast growing sequence seems to appear rarely in “natural” problems, and it
is a key ingredient for the AC1-completeness of the model checking problem. Intuitionistic logic
with one variable is strongly related to free Heyting algebras with one generator. Since Heyting
algebras are generalizations of Boolean algebras, it would be interesting to investigate whether
the difference between NC1 and AC1 is related to that between Boolean algebras and Heyting
algebras.
Theorem 6.2. The model checking problem for every superintuitionistic logic with one variable
is NC1-complete.
This follows from the discussion in Section 5.
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It is interesting to notice that the complexity results for IPC and for KC with at least two
variables are the same for the model checking problem [14]. But for the fragments with one
variable, the complexity of IPC1 is higher than that of KC1.
The fragments of IPC with a restricted number of variables and → as only connective have
finitely many equivalence classes of formulas and models [22, 8]. The equivalence class of a given
formula can be obtained with the resources of NC1, using a technique from Buss [2]. This might
indicate an upper bound lower than P for the model checking problem. For the implicational
fragment with at most one variable, NC1-completeness follows from Theorem 5. But a general
result for an arbitrary number of variables is open.
For the validity problem we obtain the following results.
Theorem 6.3.
(1) The validity problem for every superintuitionistic logic with one variable is NC1-complete.
(2) The validity problem for IPC1 is in SPACE(log n · log log n) ∩ LOGdetCFL.
Part (1) follows from the discussion in Section 5. Part (2) is from Svejdar [21] and Lemma 3.3.
The exact complexity of the validity problem for IPC1 is open. It is interesting to notice that
superintuitionistic logics with one variable all have lower complexity than IPC1, whereas for
superintuitionistic logics with two variables already KC reaches the same complexity as IPC
(follows from Rybakov [18]).
If we consider other problems related to Kripke models for IPC1 that are not “out braked”
by a very fast growing part of the input, the complexity jumps up to P-completeness, as shown
in Theorem 4.5. Model checking for IPC1 also gets P-hard if the instances 〈ϕ,M, s〉 allow the
formula ϕ to be represented as a graph. This holds even for formulas without variables, and
therefore it also holds for all superintuitionistic logics. If formulas are represented as graphs, the
sequence of smallest representatives of the equivalence classes of IPC1 does not have exponential
growth anymore. Moreover, the calculation of the Rieger-Nishimura index gets P-hard.
Theorem 6.4. If the formulas are represented as graphs, the following problems are P-complete:
(1) the model checking problem for IPC1,
(2) the model checking problem for every superintuitionistic logic with one variable,
(3) the validity problem for IPC1, and
(4) the validity problem for every superintuitionistic logic with one variable.
Parts (1) and (2) contrast the different upper bounds NC1 and AC1 for the standard encodings
of formulas (Theorem 6.2 resp. Theorem 6.1). Parts (3) and (4) contrast the complexity of the
validity problems for the logics under consideration (Theorem 6.3).
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Remark. This work is an extended version of [15]. Theorem 15 in [15] and its proof can be
found in [14, Theorem 3.6].
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Appendix A. The Rieger-Nishimura lattice operations
Let [ϕ] denote the equivalence class that contains ϕ, for being ϕ ∈ IL1. The equivalence classes
of IL1 form a free Heyting algebra over one generator (see [10]). This algebra is also called the
Rieger-Nishimura lattice (see Fig. 1), and is given by ({a},u,unionsq,_,⊥) whereas a denotes the
only one variable that occurs in the formulas of IL1. The induced partial order is denoted by
v (a v b⇔ a u b = a). For α, β ∈ IL1, the binary lattice operators u, unionsq and _ are defined as
follows. [α]u [β] = [α∧β], [α]unionsq [β] = [α∨β], and [α]_ [β] = [δ], where [δ] is the largest element
w.r.t. v with inf{[α], [δ]} v [β].10 In [16] the following properties of the operations of the
Rieger-Nishimura lattice (see Figure 1) are shown. We describe these properties as equivalences
of Rieger-Nishimura formulas. This is very similar to [10, Chap.6,Thm.7]. For example because
of ϕn+1 → ψn ≡ ϕn+2 it holds that [ϕn+1]_ [ψn] = [ϕn+2].
ϕn → ϕn ≡ > ϕn ∨ϕn ≡ ϕn
ϕn → ϕn+1 ≡ ϕn+1 ϕn ∨ϕn+1 ≡ ψn+2
ϕn → ϕn+k ≡ > for k > 1 ϕn ∨ϕn+k ≡ ϕn+k for k > 1
ϕn+k → ϕn ≡ ϕn for k ≥ 1 ϕn ∨ψn ≡ ψn+1
ϕn → ψn ≡ ϕn+1 ϕn ∨ψn+k ≡ ψn+k for k ≥ 1
ϕn → ψn+k ≡ > for k ≥ 1 ϕn+k ∨ψn ≡ ϕn+k for k ≥ 1
ϕn+1 → ψn ≡ ϕn+2 ψn ∨ψm ≡ ψmax{n,m}
ϕn+2 → ψn ≡ ϕn+1 ϕn ∨ ⊥ ≡ ϕn
ϕn+k → ψn ≡ ψn for k > 2 ψn ∨ ⊥ ≡ ψn
ψn → ψn ≡ > ϕn ∨ > ≡ >
ψn → ψn+k ≡ > for k ≥ 1 ψn ∨ > ≡ >
ψn+1 → ψn ≡ ϕn+1 ⊥ ∨> ≡ >
ψn+k → ψn ≡ ψn for k > 1 ⊥ ∨⊥ ≡ ⊥
ψn → ϕn ≡ ϕn > ∨> ≡ >
ψn+k → ϕn ≡ ϕn for k ≥ 1 ϕn ∧ϕn ≡ ϕn
ψn → ϕn+k ≡ > for k ≥ 1 ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 ≡ ⊥
ϕ1 → ⊥ ≡ ϕ2 ϕn ∧ϕn+1 ≡ ψn−1 for n > 1
ϕ2 → ⊥ ≡ ϕ1 ϕn ∧ϕn+k ≡ ϕn for k > 1
ϕn → ⊥ ≡ ⊥ for n > 2 ϕ1 ∧ψ1 ≡ ⊥
ϕn → > ≡ > ϕn ∧ψn ≡ ψn−1 for n > 1
ψ1 → ⊥ ≡ ϕ1 ϕn ∧ψn+k ≡ ϕn for k ≥ 1
ψn → ⊥ ≡ ⊥ for n > 1 ϕn+k ∧ψn ≡ ψn for k ≥ 1
ψn → > ≡ > ψn ∧ψm ≡ ψmin{n,m}
> → ϕn ≡ ϕn ϕn ∧ ⊥ ≡ ⊥
⊥ → ϕn ≡ > ψn ∧ ⊥ ≡ ⊥
> → ψn ≡ ψn ϕn ∧ > ≡ ϕn
⊥ → ψn ≡ > ψn ∧ > ≡ ψn
⊥ → > ≡ > ⊥ ∧> ≡ ⊥
> → ⊥ ≡ ⊥ ⊥ ∧⊥ ≡ ⊥
⊥ → ⊥ ≡ > > ∧> ≡ >
> → > ≡ >
10_ is called the relative pseudo-complement operation.
